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A B S T R AC T  | This article proposes to incorporate social psychology elements with mainstream political science 
and international relations theories to help understand the contradictions related to the integration processes 
in Latin America. Through a theoretical analysis, it contributes to the challenge proposed by Dabène (2009) 
to explain the “resilience” of the Latin American regional integration process in spite of its “instability and 
crises.” Our main proposition calls for considering Latin America as a community and its regional organiza-
tions as “social groups.” In conclusion, three phenomena from the field of social psychology and particularly 
social group dynamics shed light on these contradictory patterns: the value of the group and the emotional 
bond, groupthink, and cognitive dissonance.
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Dinámicas de grupos sociales y procesos de integración en América Latina
R E S U M E N  | Este artículo propone incorporar elementos de la psicología social a las perspectivas tradicio-
nales de la ciencia política y de las relaciones internacionales para explicar las dinámicas contradictorias de 
los procesos de la integración latinoamericana. Mediante un análisis teórico, responde al desafío planteado 
por Dabène (2009) para explicar la “resiliencia” de la agenda integracionista en la región a pesar de su “inesta-
bilidad y crisis”. El principal argumento consiste en considerar a Latinoamérica como una comunidad, y sus 
organizaciones regionales, como “grupos sociales”. Como conclusión, se plantea que tres fenómenos definidos 
por la psicología social, específicamente por la psicología social de grupos, permiten esclarecer estos patrones 
contradictorios: el valor del grupo y el vínculo emocional; el pensamiento grupal; y la disonancia cognitiva.
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Dinâmicas de grupos sociais e processos de integração na América Latina
R E S U M O  | Este artigo propõe incorporar elementos da psicologia social às perspectivas tradicionais da ciência 
política e das relações internacionais para explicar as dinâmicas contraditórias dos processos de integração 
latino-americana. Mediante uma análise teórica, responde ao desafio proposto por Dabène (2009) para explicar 
a “resiliência” da agenda integracionista na região apesar da sua “instabilidade e crise”. O principal argumento 
consiste em considerar a América Latina como uma comunidade e suas organizações regionais como “grupos 
sociais”. Como conclusão, propõem-se que três fenômenos definidos pela psicologia social, particularmente 
pela psicologia social de grupos, permitem esclarecer essas contradições: o valor do grupo e a vinculação 
emocional; o pensamento grupal e a dissonância cognitiva.
PA L AV R A S - C H AV E  | América Latina, psicologia social, integração, relações internacionais (Thesaurus); regio-
nalismo, comunidade latino-americana, dinâmicas de grupos sociais (Autor)
Introduction
Latin American international relations are charac-
terized by an active diplomatic agenda involving leaders 
frequently meeting —very frequently— at summits to 
stimulate the political and economic integration of the 
region or to create new organizations. Nevertheless, 
the balance of the integration process in Latin America 
has been considered at best limited and at worst a 
failure. In this context, this intense diplomatic activity, 
the multiplication of organizations with no real power 
and independence, and the participation in multilateral 
organizations that do not fulfill their goals are hard 
to understand from traditional political or economic 
perspectives. That is, these interrelated dynamics 
challenge institutional, structural and rational choice 
explanations, to mention some leading analytical 
approaches used in the study of Latin American 
integration (Oyarzún 2008).
This article offers a complementary explanation 
of these dynamics of contradictions from a social 
psychology perspective. Concretely, it suggests a set 
of arguments explaining the contradictory aspect of 
Latin American integration processes, relating it to the 
existence of a “community” of Latin American countries 
in which regional organizations are treated as “social 
groups.” Our main argument is that the existence of 
this community, easily observable in the discourse 
of authorities and the principles of various regional 
organizations and treaties, affects the decision-making 
processes regarding regional integration. In this sense, 
the proposed theoretical contribution applies the logic 
that Kaarbo (2008, 58) develops when she suggests that 
we “bring together research from social psychology 
on group processes and from political science on 
political institutions and foreign policy decision 
making.” Therefore, our claim is twofold. We suggest 
that Kaarbo’s theoretical proposition to understand 
coalition government dynamics applies to the Latin 
American integration processes and we believe that 
this theoretical perspective allows highlighting the 
social component of integration in the region.
The first section of the article presents and illustrates 
in broader details the contradictions in the behaviors 
and the discourses mentioned above. The second 
section analyzes them from a social psychology 
perspective, describing and applying key dynamics of 
social groups. Since this article seeks to contribute to 
the discussion launched by Dabène on the resilience 
of Latin American integration processes —explained 
in the next section— we use that author’s definition 
of regional integration. According to Dabène (2009, 
10-11), regional integration is a “historical process of 
increased levels of interaction between political units 
(subnational, national, or transnational), provided by 
actors sharing common ideas, setting objectives, and 
defining methods to achieve them, and by so doing 
contributing to building a region.” This definition 
allows us to consider not only the largest regional 
organizations such as the Celac (Community of Latin 
American and Caribbean Countries) and the Unasur 
(Union of South American Nations), but the five major 
sub-regional organizations such as the Mercosur 
(Common Market of South America) and the CAN 
(Andean Community of Nations) as well. It also allows 
us to consider the existing and increasing “myriad of 
bilateral and multilateral agreements” (Dabène 2009, 4).
A Region of Constant Contradictions
For decades, the Latin American integration processes 
have been characterized by a set of contradictory 
tendencies and inconsistencies among behaviors, 
foreign policy decisions, discourses and empirical 
results of the numerous organizations and treaties 
created. A few years ago, Dabène resumed the general 
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historical dynamics of the process since the 1960s in 
this double contradiction: “consistency despite insta-
bility” and “resilience despite crises” (2009, 5).
Concretely, among the particularities that best describe 
the broad dynamics of the agenda of regional integration 
since the creation of the ALADI (Latin American Associ-
ation of Integration) in 1960, it is easy to observe: 
1) the numerous individual critiques regarding the 
achievements of existing treaties and organizations; 
2) the constant tendencies to create new organiza-
tions rather than to consolidate the existing ones; 3) 
the intense diplomatic agenda of the region’s heads of 
state meeting in integration organizations and using a 
collective public discourse of constant progress at each 
summit; 4) the frequent reference to common identity, 
history and culture in both discourses and treaties; and 
5) the constant attraction to regional organizations 
and the fact that countries basically never leave them, 
in spite of their frustrations.
Frustrations and Critiques
From a political point of view, one of the most illus-
trative descriptions of the reality of regional integration 
processes in Latin America is arguably a critique made 
by Uruguayan president Tabaré Vázquez after his first 
term (2005-2010). After a first mandate that was marked 
by a long conflict with Argentina over a papermill on the 
banks of the Uruguay River that brought both countries 
to the International Court of Justice in The Hague, 
Vázquez (2013) made the following remarks:
More vocation than the Latin American to inte-
grate, there is none in the whole world. But more 
inefficiency for integration either since for that 
reason, there are so many regional integration pro-
cesses. Because until now, none of them has offered 
solutions to the real problems of our people.1
In the South American context, recent years have 
also been characterized by critiques from Mercosur 
members against what is arguably the most successful 
integration agreement of the region (Cason 2011, 2). Just 
to cite a few examples, it is possible to recall Brazilian 
President Dilma Rousseff’s calls to “make flexible” the 
internal norms of the Mercosur (“Rousseff defiende 
‘flexibilidad’” 2015); Uruguay’s accusations against 
Argentina’s measures blocking integration (“Argentina 
considera ‘injustas’ críticas de Mujica por Mercosur” 
2015); or Paraguayan authorities’ criticisms of the insta-
bility in applying the organization’s rules (“Paraguay 
critica el permanente ‘cambio de criterio’ de sus socios 
del Mercosur” 2013).
1 Free translation by the authors of the article.
Multiplication of Organizations rather than 
Consolidation of Existing Ones
It is interesting to observe a particular phenomenon 
involving Latin America when it comes to the 
“vocation for integration” described by Tabaré Vázquez. 
Usually, dissatisfaction with the rhythm or the results 
of the integration process has not led to a deepening or 
consolidation of the existing treaties and organizations, 
but rather to the constant creation of new initiatives. An 
interesting example illustrating this fact is the opinion and 
behavior of former Chilean President Sebastián Piñera 
(2010-2014). On the one hand, Piñera criticized the 
large number of meetings and organizations promoting 
integration, claiming “[w]e have the Mercosur, the 
Unasur, the ALBA,2 the MCCA,3 the Andean Community, 
the Mercosur Parliament, the Andean Parliament […][and] 
our problems remain and we lack further integration” 
(“Presidente Piñera pide acelerar integración” 2011). On 
the other hand, Piñera maintained the Chilean policy of 
limited involvement in the Mercosur and in 2011, he 
enthusiastically participated in the foundation of the 
Pacific Alliance (PA), an organization created after 
the stalling Pacific Arch, launched only four years 
before (Briceño 2010).
The rapid transformation of the Pacific Arch into 
the PA is, nevertheless, an anomaly in the region in 
the sense that organizations are not often replaced 
or transformed. When Latin American countries lose 
interest in an organization, their leaders usually alienate 
themselves from it but not to the point of abandoning 
the organization or eliminating it. The example given by 
Parthenay regarding the Central American Integration 
System (SICA) is illustrative of that dynamics. In SICA, 
the author argues, “some presidents have pragmati-
cally distanced themselves from presidential summits, 
thus creating a vicious circle detrimental to regional 
integration” (Parthenay 2016, 3129).
One of the most important consequences of the above-
mentioned dynamic is a complex logic of leaders multi-
plying organizations and refusing to consolidate and 
institutionalize the existing ones. This tendency leads 
to “overlapping,” or a situation in which a large number 
of organizations share the same interests and objec-
tives. Even though there is no consensus on the nature 
and level of the impact of overlapping on the general 
dynamics of Latin American integration (see Nolte and 
Comini 2016, 547-549), authors such as Malamud 
and Gardini (2012) and Portales (2016) claim that it 
causes divisions and serious problems of coordination. 
In the same vein, Altmann argues that “Latin America is 
not only fragmented, but also fractured and weakened 
2 “ALBA” stands for Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of 
our America.
3 “MCCA” stands for “Central American Common Market.”
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by an oversupply of integration processes […][causing] 
pressures on the leaders’ agenda, a lack of coordination, 
convergence problems and weak institutionalization 
explained by the leaders’ refusal to transfer powers to 
supranational entities” (Altmann 2011, 213).4
Nevertheless, where some see institutional weakness, 
others see flexibility. For example, rather than focus on 
these supposed consequences of overlapping, Nolte and 
Comini propose the argument according to which an 
organization such as the Unasur was created because its 
member countries “wanted it to happen.” The organi-
zation also has “institutional flexibility” because it is 
what South American governments “wanted it to be” 
(2016, 546). In this sense, the institutional dynamics of 
Latin American integration is a product of the decisions 
and preferences of leaders. And the absence of strong, 
consolidated, autonomous or rigid regional institutions 
is a deliberate choice of decision-makers.
This idea of deliberate choice is also observable in 
Cason’s analysis of the Mercosur. According to said 
author, the reluctance of leaders to strengthen the 
regional institutions is a “self-conscious” strategy 
designed “to increase the flexibility in the process by 
not5 tying the hands of the integration partners, since 
they know unexpected shocks present themselves” 
(Cason 2011, 13). Along the same lines, for the Chilean 
diplomat Carlos Portales, the combination of the three 
different dynamics —the multiplication of organiza-
tions, the overlapping on issues, and the problems 
of coordination— explains the “erosion of [member 
states’] commitment to realize the goals they have 
agreed on.” Portales also suggests that this organiza-
tional context contributes to cynicism when he relates 
it to the example of former Uruguayan President José 
Mujica’s answer to a journalist asking him about the 
decisions taken at a Mercosur summit. “I do not know… 
We agree on a statement,” said the Uruguayan leader 
(Portales 2016, 5023).
Intense Diplomatic Activity and the Impossibility 
of Being Against Integration
This last quote from Portales is directly related to a 
striking fact also revealed by the diplomat: “[t]he total 
number of summits among countries in the region 
increased from 31 between 1947 and 1989 to 303 from 
1990 to 2012” (Portales 2016, 4944). That is, during the 
Cold War era, Latin American leaders met in different 
kinds of summits on an average of once every twenty 
months, but since the end of the Cold War, they have 
attended summits approximately thirteen times a year, 
4 Free translation by the authors of this article.
5 Emphasis in the original text.
mostly in regular meetings of organizations intended 
to promote cooperation and regional integration.
Even though Latin American leaders frequently 
criticize the organizations, they constantly meet and 
the summits “typically end with a communiqué, a group 
photo, and the assurance that the meeting has been 
quite useful and extremely productive” (Mace et al. 
2016a, 5031). That is, the official discourse of the leaders 
is highly optimistic when they are together and in 
public. Nevertheless, Mace et al. add that behind these 
official discourses, there usually is “a wide gap between 
the objectives laid out in summit communiqués and 
concrete results.”
The inconsistencies between empirical results and 
official discourses, and the heavy diplomatic activity 
resulting from the multiplication of organizations have 
two consequences in the regional diplomatic practices. 
To relate them to social psychology, both of these conse-
quences highlight the existence of a Latin American 
community, an idea that will be developed in the second 
section of this article. The first consequence is illustrated 
by Jenne and Schenoni (2015) in a recent investigation 
in which the authors analyze Latin American leaders’ 
speeches before the United Nations General Assembly 
between 1994 and 2014. The authors make this signif-
icant assertion: “it is remarkable that governments have 
thought it necessary to make an average of more than 
four allusions to the region in each of the[ir] speeches” 
(Jenne and Schenoni 2015, 2). For these authors, the combi-
nation of the discourses laying out the importance of 
regional cooperation with the setbacks of the integration 
processes makes them conclude with the existence of a 
“declaratory regionalism in Latin America.” By declar-
atory regionalism, they mean an “act of discursively 
referring to regional organizations, regional identities 
and/or the macro- and micro-regions the Latin American 
countries see themselves as being part of” (Jenne and 
Schenoni 2015, 1).
The second consequence of the gap between the 
speeches and the results of integration processes 
follows the same perspective, but this time from a 
more qualitative focus. According to Rivera (2014, 
13-14), the logic of the existence of repeated discourses 
referring to regional cooperation makes it highly 
difficult for Latin American leaders to oppose regional 
integration publicly. In the end, in spite of their dissatis-
faction and their frustrations with regional cooperation, 
Latin American leaders meet often, constantly refer 
to their unity, and tend to adopt a collective discourse 
highlighting the progress of the political and economic 
integration processes.
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Frequent References to Common Identity in both 
Speeches and Treaties
The generalized pro-integration tone of the public 
speeches is also observable in the declaration of 
principles of various multilateral regional organiza-
tions, explicitly illustrating the idea of an existing 
community of Latin American countries, as will be 
further described in the second part of this article. 
References to a common history, common culture 
and the brotherhood of Latin American countries are 
frequent and also motivated the creation of the Celac, 
a regional organization whose principal characteristic 
is arguably that of including all the countries of the 
hemisphere, except for Canada and the United States. 
What is theoretically fundamental for the argument 
about the complementary contribution of social 
psychology to the study of Latin American integration 
processes is the fact that the community existed prior to 
the foundation of regional organizations in this region 
(Rivarola and Briceño 2013; Rivera 2014). Therefore, 
leaders’ speeches tend to present regional integration 
as a natural outcome. This is a paramount difference 
with respect to an organization or treaty generated 
precisely to create a new community with common 
identities and values  —a logic observable in the trans-
formation of the European Economic Community into 
the European Union, for example.
The existence of a Latin American community can also 
explain another fundamental fact about the history of 
international relations in the region. Even though the 
region has historically experienced a large number of 
boundary disputes and high levels of social and political 
violence, interstate relations have traditionally been very 
peaceful, especially when compared to other regions of 
the world (Domínguez and Covarrubias 2015, 1).
According to Domínguez et al. (2004), a major factor 
explaining the capacity to avoid the militarization of 
disputes has been, precisely, the sense of belonging 
to a social group of Latin American countries. As the 
authors claim:
An important ideological innovation in Latin America 
at the beginning of the 19th century contributed 
to interstate peace. The majority of the Hispano-
American elites accepted the idea that they were all 
part of a broader cultural and potentially political 
entity. Thus, their nations should not fight one 
another. As was correctly observed by Miguel 
Ángel Centeno, there was no “complex discourse 
on international hatred,” but the basic idea that the 
neighbor country was not my enemy. (2004, 370)6
6 Free translation by the authors of the article.
Countries Fundamentally Never Leave 
Underachieving Regional Organizations
Latin American countries have initiated a great 
number of treaties and organizations, which explains 
the intense diplomatic agenda they maintain. An 
interesting fact about these organizations is that even 
in the case of the most criticized ones; exiting from 
them never seems to be an option. From a general 
point of view, it can be said that the organizations are 
never institutionalized, they are constantly criticized, 
they arguably do not fulfill their goals completely, they 
may be weakened by leaders, but they are basically 
never abandoned nor formally broken down. Chile’s 
exit from the Andean Pact in 1978 and Venezuela’s exit 
from the Andean Community of Nations in 2006 to join 
the Mercosur are the only examples of abandonment of 
a multilateral organization by a full-member country in 
half a century of regional integration processes in Latin 
America. Even though they have expressed concerns, 
dissatisfaction, and threats of abandoning the Mercosur 
for years, Paraguay and Uruguay have never come 
anywhere close to actually leaving the organization to 
gain more independence for their commercial policies.
Nevertheless, it is worth mentioning that countries 
have abandoned political, judicial or diplomatic 
treaties and organizations such as the Inter-American 
Human Rights Court (IHRC) or the Bogota Pact on 
certain occasions. However, these decisions always 
bring them heavy criticism, as was the case when the 
late Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez announced 
his country was leaving the IHRC in 2012 (“Críticas a 
Venezuela por salida de la Corte IDH” 2012).
Contradictions and Theoretical Difficulties in 
Explaining Them
The differences between the leaders’ behaviors, the 
collective official discourses, the personal criticisms, 
on the one hand, and the concrete results of Latin 
American integration processes on the other, pose a 
serious challenge to traditional theoretical perspec-
tives on cooperation and integration. For that reason, 
we agree with Dabène when the author claims “[a]ll 
these ups and downs [in the Latin American integration 
processes] make the exercise of theorization and 
prediction very risky and are an invitation to modesty” 
(2009, 5). According to that same author, they also show 
the limitations of traditional and mainstream European 
theoretical frameworks when applied to the Latin 
American reality.
Among the limitations of traditional theories of 
integration when it comes to explaining the contradic-
tions of Latin American processes, four examples are 
illustrative. We agree with Dabène (2009) and Rivarola 
and Briceño (2013) that institutions matter and that the 
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accumulated experience from history and contexts of 
decision-making processes are essential. But we believe 
that this perspective hardly helps to understand the 
multiplication of organizations and the survival of 
underachieving ones. From the constructivist position, 
we agree with Duina that an integration project, such as 
a free trade agreement, “is a social endeavor” (2006, 3). 
Nevertheless, this perspective can hardly offer expla-
nations regarding the underachievement of the organi-
zations created, the leaders’ reluctance to create real 
supranational regional organizations with effective 
powers, as well as their frequent lack of compliance. 
The same logic can also be applied to the limitations 
of traditional game theory models in the sense that 
repetition through time should facilitate cooperation, 
trust, and compliance (Axelrod 1986, 31). Latin American 
integration processes have a long history and leaders 
meet many times each year, but the results are weak 
and compliance is limited at best. Other traditional 
perspectives such as transnationalism or intergovern-
mentalism also have their limitations when observers of 
Latin American integration dynamics wish to explain the 
existence of weak institutions or the signing of agree-
ments that are not applied and end in a state of inertia.
Our theoretical claim regarding the contribution of 
social psychology and social group dynamics to explain 
the contradictions in Latin American integration 
processes can be resumed in two main assertions. 
First, Latin American countries share enough cultural 
assets through many regional multilateral organiza-
tions to refer to the region as a community. Second, in 
this context, socialization takes on special importance and 
organizations promoting integration can be analyzed, in 
their broad dynamics, on the basis of the fact that they 
are “social groups.”
Social Group Dynamics and the Resilience of 
the Latin American Integration Processes
How does this idea of Latin America as a community 
help to understand the decision-making processes 
and the contradictions regarding countries’ behavior 
in regional organizations? To answer this question, 
it is necessary to start considering step-by-step 
some central concepts from the subfield of the social 
psychology of groups in order to guide the analysis of 
the dynamics of formation and continuity of regional 
organizations and the decision-making processes of 
the region’s political leaders.
The Definition of a Social Group Is and the 
Purpose of Group Formation
The first element to start with, although it might seem 
trivial, is the definition of the concept of “group” and 
whether or not it fits with the regional dynamics of 
international organizations in Latin America. That 
is, from a social psychology perspective, are regional 
organizations social groups? Is it therefore possible to 
speak of group behavior?
Following the ideas of social psychologist Henri Tajfel 
(1982, 2), a group can be defined on the basis of external 
and/or internal criteria. On the one hand, external criteria 
are designations from the outside, i.e., from individuals 
who do not belong to the “group,” like “college students” 
for professors and “college professors” for students. 
Internal criteria, on the other hand, relate to “group 
identification.” In order to achieve the level of identi-
fication, Tajfel claims that three kinds of elements are 
necessary: 1) a cognitive one in the sense of membership 
awareness; 2) an evaluative one in the sense that this 
awareness is related to value connotations; and 3) an 
emotional investment in the awareness and evaluation. 
These three elements can be found in the discourse 
of Latin American leaders and in various constitutive 
treaties of regional organizations. For example, the 
preamble of the foundational treaty of the Unasur 
mentions the existence of a “shared history and solidarity 
of our nations […] that fought for emancipation and 
the South American unity,” and also a “determination 
to the construction of a South American identity and 
citizenship” (Unasur 2008).
The combination of cognitive, evaluative and 
commitment elements is also observable in declarations 
made at meetings of the Celac. During its 2016 annual 
meeting in Ecuador, the 33 heads of state attending 
adopted a declaration with a clear affirmation of a sense 
of belonging to a particular group. The official decla-
ration of the organization’s summit starts by saying: 
“We, the heads of state and government of the Celac 
[…]; We reaffirm our decision to consolidate our unity 
and advance towards Latin American and Caribbean 
integration, based on profound historical roots, in the 
heritage of the Community […], sharing values and 
related interests, and propose to achieve the well-being 
of our peoples” (Celac 2016).
In the same line of analysis, Tajfel and Turner (1986) 
point out that the essential criteria to belong to a group 
are that individuals define themselves and are defined 
by others as members of the group. In this sense, a 
group is defined as “a collection of individuals who 
perceive themselves to be members of the same social 
category, share some emotional involvement in this 
common definition of themselves, and achieve some 
degree of social consensus about the evaluation of their 
group and of their membership in it” (Tajfel and Turner 
1986, 15). Here again, the origin and goals of the Celac, 
the first organization of countries including all, and 
only, Latin American and Caribbean countries, follow 
this logic. According to these authors, categorization 
is a cognitive tool to sort and classify the environment 
and generate identification, which results in social 
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identity. To claim that Latin American countries form 
a unique and distinct community echoes this categori-
zation issue.
After labeling regional organizations as groups, the 
next question relates to the general purpose of group 
formation. Why do Latin American countries form 
groups? Following Bandura’s logic (2000), we consider 
that countries, just like individuals, do not live their 
“lives” independently. For that matter, there are many 
results that can only be obtained through interde-
pendent efforts. In the same vein, Lawler, Thye and 
Yoon (2000, 616) refer to the idea of  social exchange as 
a joint activity, in which two or more players attempt 
to produce benefits that they would not receive if they 
were alone. In this regard, the commitment of people 
to a group has two important elements: the reduction 
of uncertainty and the production of positive emotions 
related to individual-group exchange.
In the historical context of Latin American integration 
processes, one clear example that serves to illustrate 
the need to form a group to obtain benefits that are 
unattainable individually is the process leading to 
the formation of the Mercosur between 1985 and 
1994. The founding treaty served three major goals 
related to security and development that each of the 
member states felt unsure of attaining individually: the 
consolidation of democracy (Fournier 1999), the need to 
cooperate in a period of formation of regional blocks 
(Tulchin and Espach 2001) after the failure of World 
Trade Organization (WTO) negotiations, and the need 
to stabilize the economy after the decade of debt crisis 
(Edwards 1995). Since economic crises and threats to 
democratic stability are elements that produce great 
uncertainty for states, the Mercosur clearly illus-
trates the two benefits that group formation brings to 
partners: positive emotions and reduction of uncer-
tainty (Lawler, Thye and Yoon 2000).
Furthermore, according to Lawler, Thye and Yoon (2000, 
642), constant exchange reduces uncertainty; actors 
learn more about others, become more predictable, 
and may infer and confirm their orientations. These 
elements are considered to be benefits of commitment, 
as individuals tend to avoid uncontrollable and unpre-
dictable contexts. From a political and diplomatic point 
of view, this constant exchange can be observed in the 
socialization function of the summits and numerous 
meetings involving Latin American leaders (Mace et 
al. 2016b). The more leaders meet, the more they start 
forming a group in which others’ behavior becomes 
predictable and uncertainty is reduced. In that sense, 
not being part of the group, or leaving it, opens the door 
for unpredictable behavior and for greater uncertainty 
among the countries of the region.
Group Dynamics and Decision-Making Processes
After describing some general characteristics and 
benefits of group formation, the next step is to 
contribute to the explanation of the resilience of 
the regional organizations. Two questions guide 
our analysis in this next section. First, why are Latin 
American organizations and treaties maintained over 
time if they apparently do not achieve the objec-
tives for which they were created? Second, why do 
members accept decisions with which they may not 
feel comfortable? The argument here is that three 
group dynamics affect the decision-making processes 
regarding permanence in regional organizations. They 
are: 1) the value of the group itself, 2) groupthink, and 3) 
cognitive dissonance.
The Value of the Group Itself and the Emotional Bond
Lawler, Thye and Yoon (2000, 623) argue that through a 
repetitive exchange, groups become social objects that 
have a cognitive and subjective reality for their members, 
and groups thus begin to have value of their own. This 
fact goes beyond the instrumental explanation; groups 
become objects of intrinsic value given the positive 
emotions that the exchange generates. Lawler and Yoon 
(1996, 105) also suggest that, unlike what rational choice 
theory may claim, the analysis of the group dynamics 
should focus on endogenous processes. That is, the 
decision to stay in a group is produced endogenously 
through relational cohesion, which reflects the fact 
that exchange has become an object of value in itself. 
In concrete political and diplomatic terms, this logic 
can explain why dissatisfied countries may threaten to 
leave an organization but rarely end up doing so. Here, 
the examples of Uruguay remaining in the Mercosur 
despite repeated conflicts with its neighbors, or Costa 
Rica remaining in the SICA in spite of major difficulties 
with Nicaragua, are illustrations of this phenomenon.
In this regard, Hudson (2007, 77) suggests that when a 
group is formed, two forces come into play: 1) a decision-
making process aimed at solving the problem that 
motivated the group’s formation; and 2) the motivation 
to continue functioning as a group. This is fundamental 
when the different waves of integration are directly 
related to crises or critical junctures (Dabène 2009, 
27-28). In addition to this, group cohesion is a source 
of emotional support for the group since it decreases 
stress. However, when small groups are maintained 
over time, stress can be generated by fear of ostracism 
(Hudson 2007, 77). In this sense, Hudson’s argument is 
that the fear originally generated by failure to meet the 
group’s goals is compensated by the emotional support 
the group provides.
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The emotional bond the group generates increases the 
costs of leaving it or of adopting a deviant behavior in 
the context of the “Latin American community” because 
of the negative reactions this behavior may provoke. The 
consequent fear of ostracism, the possibility of being 
held responsible for failure, and the distress that loss 
of emotional support generates seem to explain foreign 
policy decision-making dynamics when it comes to Latin 
American integration processes. One illustrative example 
of how emotional elements can influence foreign policy 
is the decision of Chilean authorities to remain in the 
Pact of Bogota —until now—, fearing to be seen as a bad 
neighbor in a context of tense relations with Peru and 
Bolivia over border issues that have been brought to the 
International Court of Justice (Álvarez 2016).
Groupthink
What is groupthink and how can it be linked to Latin 
American international relations and foreign policy 
decision-making regarding integration processes? The 
groupthink phenomenon in foreign policy decision-
making has been analyzed by Janis (1982), who tries 
to explain some critical US foreign policy decisions. 
According to said author, groupthink is related to 
the deterioration of mental efficiency, reality testing, 
and moral judgment that results from peer pressure. 
This occurs in highly cohesive groups where the need 
for unanimity exceeds the motivation to analyze 
new courses of action realistically. For Janis (1982, 7), 
policy-making groups are exposed to different types of 
pressures; members tend to develop informal norms 
to maintain friendly intragroup relations, and these 
become part of the hidden agenda at their meetings. 
In the case of regional organizations, the efforts and 
resources invested in integration processes over the 
years, plus the numerous speeches that different leaders 
have given extolling their importance, are elements 
that can generate the pressure needed to cause the 
emergence of groupthink in deciding whether or not 
to continue as members of a regional organization. 
That is, if the decision to be made relates to remaining 
or leaving the organization, the pressure experienced 
by group members can generate any of the flaws 
indicated by Janis.7 The same logic of peer pressure 
and the adoption of suboptimal group decisions is even 
more likely to happen when decisions are taken on the 
basis of unanimity, as is the case with most of the Latin 
American organizations.
7 Janis (1982) identifies seven flaws in decision-making that 
affect problem-solving: 1) the group decision is limited to 
few alternatives; 2) the group does not discuss the goals 
and values  involved in their decision; 3) the group fails to 
reexamine the initially chosen course of action; 4) members 
do not review courses of action initially assessed as negative; 
5) they do not try to obtain information from experts; 6) 
there is a selective bias in terms of how the group reacts to 
specific information; 7) they do not have contingency plans 
to address any problems that arise.
Another concept that can be linked to the groupthink 
phenomenon regarding both the need for unanimity 
and the existence of peer pressure is the “black sheep 
effect.” Once a group is formed, a process of intergroup 
differentiation takes place. In addition to this separation, 
it is possible to distinguish in-group disparities as well. 
In this case each Latin American country has a specific 
role and a particular way of operating. According to 
Hogg (2001, 66), there are differences within the group 
in terms of how much members do or do not subscribe 
to the group prototype. The author brings up the 
concept of prototypical gradient; some people within 
the group are closer to the group’s prototype than 
others, and this can provide an understanding of group 
deviation phenomena. Hogg (2001, 68) also suggests 
that group members who do not seem to match the 
prototype attract negative reactions and are considered 
pathological and threatening. This is known as the 
“black sheep” phenomenon, in which reactions towards 
group members who deviate from the group prototype 
are even more negative than those towards people from 
other groups. Deviant behavior is thus seriously punished 
by group members.
In this regard, Marques et al. (2001, 408) indicate that 
when group members perceive that deviation affects 
the validity of the norm, it becomes a critical issue due to 
possible damages to group distinctiveness. The authors 
also note that this phenomenon may affect decision-
making processes since it generates intolerance to 
different opinions, censorship, self-censorship and 
rejection of deviant members. Therefore, the black 
sheep effect may generate the flaws described by Janis 
(1982) and affect the decision-making process in terms 
of limiting the decision to a just few alternatives and 
biasing the reaction to information. Here again, Chile 
may represent an illustrative case of the black sheep 
effect as it tries to maintain its autonomy from regional 
organizations but cannot leave them, especially when 
it receives constant criticism from its neighbors 
(“Morales rechaza ‘chantajes’” 2015).
Cognitive Dissonance
Furthermore, the groupthink phenomenon can also be 
linked to the concept of cognitive dissonance, which 
was originally proposed by Festinger (1957). According 
to that author, cognitive dissonance refers to the 
existence of inconsistent cognitions, i.e., two cognitive 
elements that do not fit together. Applied to the Latin 
American case, dissonance can be observed in the 
inconsistency between the motivations to create and 
stay in an organization aimed at generating integration 
and the fact that regional projects have not achieved 
the goals that catalyzed their formation.
Regarding cognitive dissonance, Festinger (1957) 
highlights two additional elements: 1) it generates a 
feeling of discomfort that motivates people to try to 
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reduce it and achieve consistency; 2) and when a disso-
nance occurs, people will actively try to avoid situations 
and information that tend to increase it. According to 
Festinger (1957), dissonance can be eliminated through 
different strategies.
The first strategy would be to change a behavioral 
cognitive element: when dissonance between an 
environmental element —knowledge of a certain 
situation— and a behavioral element occurs, it can be 
eliminated by changing the behavioral element to 
make it consistent with the environment. In the Latin 
American case, countries can change their behavior and 
withdraw from the organizations. However, as we have 
seen, this has consequences in terms of rejection by the 
group, in addition to the loss of the emotional bond. It 
is therefore easier and less costly for states to keep on 
participating in meetings and signing the final declara-
tions, which typically emphasize that “the meeting has 
been quite useful and extremely productive” (Mace et 
al. 2016a, 5044).
The second available strategy is to change an environ-
mental cognitive element, “by changing the situation 
to which the element corresponds” (Festinger 1957, 
19). However, the possibilities of manipulating the 
environment are highly limited. Environments can be 
modified by changing social reality with the means of 
gaining the agreement and support of other people. In 
the Latin American case, and at the risk of extending 
this definition, one could hypothesize that new groups 
are generated as a way of changing environmental 
circumstances —rather than modifying countries’ 
behavior and withdrawing from the organization. This 
would help explain the historical tendency to create 
new organizations rather than to reform existing ones. 
The abovementioned example of the creation of the 
Pacific Alliance and its plan to avoid creating political 
institutions at some point illustrates this strategy.
The third strategy that can be adopted to reduce 
cognitive dissonance is to add new cognitive elements. 
In this situation, different cognitive elements may be 
added to achieve consistency; a person may actively 
seek information to reduce dissonance and decide to 
avoid new information that increases it (Festinger 
1957, 21). In the Latin American case, there are a variety 
of possibilities for adding new cognitive elements. 
For example, countries can insist that everything is 
working well, that integration projects are moving 
forward, and simply publicly ignore information that 
does not fit with that impression.
According to Festinger (1957, 24), cognitive dissonance 
is linked to resistance to change; otherwise, it would 
not last. In this vein, Jervis (1976, 387) points out that to 
reduce dissonance, people alter their beliefs and evalu-
ations, a strategy that affects future decisions, actions, 
and perceptions. One of the most important implica-
tions of this conduct is linked to the force that disso-
nance adds to the power of inertia. Based on cognitive 
dissonance theory, Jervis (1976, 387) indicates two 
possible explanations as to why policies are maintained. 
The first suggests that after taking a decision, a person 
will not only minimize or misinterpret discrepant 
information, but will also seek information that is 
consistent with her ideas —selective exposure. The 
second hypothesis is linked to the purpose and effect of 
reducing dissonance, namely to produce a separation of 
the post-decision alternatives. After taking a decision, 
individuals feel they have chosen correctly, even when 
prior to that decision the policy obviously did not seem 
to be the best. In this regard, Tindale et al. (2001, 10) 
indicate that after a discussion, the shared preference 
tends to increase, regardless of whether all members 
agree or not with the choice. In this sense, shared 
preferences in a group both influence and are influ-
enced by group decision-making.
Finally, Jervis (1976, 387) adds that separation of alter-
natives generates inertia because decision-makers 
increase the amount of discrepant information 
necessary to reverse the policy. Moreover, disso-
nance reduction indirectly alters the decision-making 
process since it increases the tendency to employ 
principles or values used in previous behaviors, which 
are thus reinforced. Another important issue for 
Jervis is that expenditure of resources increases the 
pressure of dissonance and reinforces the belief that a 
policy is being successful; when a policy has high costs, 
decision-makers are more likely to believe that they 
have achieved something that was worth the sacrifice. 
Two manifestations of this effect are the tendency to 
overestimate what has been achieved and to perceive 
failures as successes. Here again, these two manifes-
tations can help to explain the intense diplomatic 
agenda regarding Latin American integration processes, 
the multiplication of organizations and meetings that 
come with them and, finally, the constant discourses of 
progress and success of each organization.
Conclusions
This paper has looked at social psychology and theories 
of social group formation to complement traditional 
theories of cooperation and integration developed 
mostly in political science and international relations 
literature. We believe that these theories have important 
limitations when it comes to explaining contradictory 
behaviors, discourses, and decisions related to Latin 
American integration. Why do leaders spend so much 
time and resources participating in organizations and 
treaties? Especially when history teaches them that 
they will not agree on institutionalizing these organi-
zations and that the latter will hardly meet their goals? 
And also, why do leaders keep creating new organiza-
tions, attending their frequent meetings and signing 
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declarations proclaiming a success in which they do not 
always believe? A few possible explanations for these 
contradictions and the phenomenon of persistence 
of regional grouping over time have been presented 
from a social psychology perspective. In Latin America, 
organizations are social groups that tend to become an 
end in themselves, groupthink affects behavior, and 
states try to avoid cognitive dissonance when it comes 
to integration processes. We believe that these different 
dynamics generate inertia and finally contribute to the 
resilience and understanding of regional integration in 
Latin America.
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